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THE RHETORIC OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
Erwin Chemerinsky*

I spend much of my time dealing with Supreme Court opinions.
Usually, I download and read them the day that they are announced
by the Court. I edit them for my casebook and teach them to my stu
dents. I write about them, lecture about them, and litigate about them.
My focus, like I am sure most everyone's, is functional: I try to discern
the holding, appraise the reasoning, ascertain the implications, and
evaluate the decision's desirability.
Increasingly, though, I have begun to think that this functional ap
proach is overlooking a crucial aspect of Supreme Court decisions:
their rhetoric. I use rhetoric here, not in the popular pejorative sense,
but in the classical meaning of the word. The Supreme Court's opin
ions are rhetoric in that they are reasoned arguments intended to per
suade. I believe that we can gain new insights about the Court and
constitutional law by looking at the opinions from a rhetorical per
spective.
Imagine that the Supreme Court decided cases without published
opinions. This is not inconceivable.' Other branches of government
generally make their choices without written opinions. Congress gen
erally provides legislative history for its bills, but it usually is about ex
plaining the meaning of the provisions more than presenting a persua
sive argument in favor of a law. Most state and local governments
don't even provide a formal legislative history for their enactments.
Presidents tend to act without formal statements justifying their con
duct. Even in lower courts, cases are most frequently decided without
published opinion. One study found that there is no written opinion in
almost seventy-five percent of federal court of appeals decisions.2 But
every Supreme Court decision has a written opinion.3
* Sydney M. Irmas Professor of Public Interest Law, Legal Ethics, and Political Science,
University of Southern California Law School. B.S. 1975, Northwestern; J.D. 1978, Harvard
- Ed. I am very grateful to Catherine Fisk for many very helpful conversations discussing
this topic and to Amy Kreutner for her excellent research assistance. I also am grateful to
the participants at faculty workshops at Syracuse Law School and Whittier Law School for
their ideas and suggestions.

1. Written opinions by courts can be traced back to Roman law and were a key part of
the English legal tradition that was followed in the United States. See Patricia M. Wald, The
Rhetoric of Results and the Results of Rhetoric: Judicial Writings, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 1371 n.l
(1995).

2.

Id. at 1713 n.3.

3. This is not to say that every Supreme Court action has a written opinion. The
Supreme Court's denials of certiorari, which dispose of over ninety-eight percent of cases
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If there were no written opinions, the practice and teaching of law
would be vastly different. There would be no rules of constitutional
law announced by the Court; there would only be those principles that
could be inferred from the Court deciding a case in a particular way.
Lawyers would argue over what a result means and lower courts
would try to determine the implications of rulings to avoid being re
versed. Professors would try to weave the results into a coherent body
of law and they, not the Court, would then be in control of the rhetoric
of constitutional law. But obviously, the whole nature and enterprise
of constitutional law would be vastly different. Just imagine what it
would be like to teach or study constitutional law if there were no
written opinions from the Supreme Court.
In this paper, I want to begin to examine the rhetorical aspects of
constitutional law and what can be learned by focusing on them.4 In
any rhetorical enterprise there are three key components: the speaker,
the message, and the audience.5 Part I of this paper focuses on the
message - the opinions themselves. Part II looks at the many audi
ences for Supreme Court opinions and what can be understood about
the Court and constitutional law from each. Finally, Part III looks at
the Court as a speaker.
A few disclaimers at the outset. The focus is only on the Supreme
Court and not on lower federal courts or state courts. Undoubtedly,
many of the same characteristics are present in the rhetoric of all
courts. But there also are differences: a key aspect of the rhetoric of
lower courts is demonstrating consistency with the rulings of a higher
court and perhaps trying to predict what the higher court will do.6
More importantly, focusing on the Supreme Court offers a finite body
of opinions to examine; the opinions of all of the lower federal and
state courts seem almost infinite by comparison.
Also, the focus is exclusively on constitutional, as opposed to statu
tory, decisions. Again, unquestionably, there are similarities in the
Supreme Court's decisions, whether constitutional or statutory. There
are, however, also key differences in how results are explained in con
stitutional as opposed to statutory cases. There is a voluminous literabrought to it, are not justified in a written opinion, though sometimes there are published
dissents from the denial of certiorari. The law, however, is clear that a denial of certiorari is
not precedent; it is in no way a decision of the issues in the case.
4. In working on this, I have come to realize that this Article is only the beginning of a
much longer, book-length examination of the topic. I thus regard this Article as a rather ten
tative initial exploration of something I hope to work on for some time to come.
5. Actually, there is a fourth: a feedback loop where the speaker responds to the reac
tion of the audience. This, too, is worthy of consideration as to constitutional law, though in
this Article, I just examine speaker, message, and audience.

6. See Evan H. Caminker, Precedent and Prediction: The Forward- Looking Aspects of
Inferior Court Decisionmaking, 73 TEXAS L. REV. 1 (1994) (discussing whether it is the role
of lower courts to attempt to predict what the higher court will do).
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ture on statutory interpretation7 that shows approaches often quite dif
ferent from the methods of constitutional interpretation. Also, the
rhetorical enterprise is different because the Court knows that
Congress can effectively overrule decisions interpreting statutes by re
vising the laws, but constitutional decisions can be overruled only
through the cumbersome amendment process.8
My central thesis is that the opinions written by the Justices and is
sued by the Court are a central, not an incidental, aspect of American
constitutional law and that focusing on the opinions as rhetoric can
help us to understand and appraise the Supreme Court's work. There
is both a descriptive and a normative aspect to this enterprise: both
identifying and describing aspects of the rhetoric of constitutional law
and also normatively assessing the desirability of the Court's actions.
I.

THE MESSAGE

In this section, I want to focus on characteristics of the opinions
themselves. Although there are many, here I will focus on four: (A)
Opinions are written to make results seem determinate and value-free,
rather than indeterminate and value-based; (B) Opinions are written
to appear consistent with precedent, even when they are not; (C)
Opinions are written to make decisions seem restrained, rather than
activist; dissents criticize decisions as activist and not restrained; and
(D) The language used by the Court has changed over time; my im
pression - and I present it as just that, a subjective sense - is that the
language is less eloquent and more sarcastic than before.
A. Opinions Are Written to Make Results Seem Determinate and
Value-Free, Rather Than Indeterminate and Value-Based
The outcome of the vast majority of Supreme Court cases is inde
terminate in the sense that reasonable Justices and people can differ as
to the proper interpretation of the Constitution as it applies to a spe
cific case. Phrased differently, rarely in constitutional cases can any re
sult be justified as the one and only correct choice.9 Inescapably, value
choices need to be made when the Supreme Court interprets constitu
tional provisions.

7. See, e.g., William N. Eskridge, Jr., Dynamic Statutory Interpretation, 135 U. PA. L.
REV. 1479 (1987); Cass R. Sunstein, Statutory Interpretation in the Regulatory State, 103
HARV. L. REV. 405 (1989).
8. Also, statutory rulings touch on every area of federal law, most of which are far be
yond my field. Focusing on constitutional law is, in large part, a function of the desire to stay
within my field.
9. Of course, even to speak of "correct" rulings is to beg the question of whether such a
thing exists and this, too, inherently involves a value choice.
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The reasons for this are familiar and fairly obvious. Often the
Court deals with issues where there are no textual provisions to inter
pret. Is the president entitled to claim executive privilege and what is
its scope?10 Is there constitutional protection for basic aspects of lib
erty such as the right to marry,1 1 the right to procreate,12 the right to
custody of one's children,13 the right to keep the family together,14 the
right to raise one's children,15 the right to purchase and use contracep
tives,16 the right to abortion,17 and the right to refuse medical care?18
Some might say that the silence of the Constitution should be the basis
for deciding the cases; but that, of course, is itself a value choice about
how to interpret the Constitution, and one that the majority of the
Court has clearly rejected in these decisions.
Even when there are textual provisions, interpreting them inevita
bly requires value choices as to their meaning. Is the death penalty as
applied to the mentally retarded "cruel and unusual punishment" in
violation of the Eighth Amendment?19 Is government aid to parochial
schools, in the form of vouchers, a law impermissibly "respecting the
establishment of religion"?20
Perhaps most commonly, constitutional cases involve balancing,
and this inherently requires a value choice. Sometimes there is a con
flict between two constitutional rights, such as in the recent case where
the Court had to weigh freedom of the press and the right to privacy in
deciding whether the First Amendment protects the right of the media
to broadcast the tape of a conversation that was illegally intercepted
10. See, e.g., United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 ( 1974) (holding that executive privi
lege exists, but is not absolute and must yield to overriding needs for information).
11. See, e.g., Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978) (recognizing a fundamental right
to marry); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
12. Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535 ( 1942) (recognizing a funda
mental right to procreate).
13. See, e.g., Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972) (recognizing a fundamental right to
custody, including for unmarried fathers).
14. See, e.g., Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977) (invalidating a zoning
ordinance that prevented a grandmother from living with her grandchildren).
15. See, e.g., Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57 (2000) (declaring unconstitutional an order
of grandparents' rights over the mother's objection).
16. See, e.g., Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S.
479 (1965), discussed infra at text accompanying notes 39-45.
17. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 ( 1992); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S.
179 (1973).
18. See, e.g., Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dept. of Health, 497 U.S. 261 ( 1990) (recognizing a
right of competent adults to refuse medical treatment).
19. Atkins v. Virginia, 122 S.Ct. 2242 (2002) (holding that the death penalty for the men
tally retarded is unconstitutional).
20. Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 122 S.Ct. 2460 (2002) (holding that the Establishment
Clause is not violated by vouchers used in parochial schools).

2012

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 100:2008

and recorded.21 Sometimes the very definition of the right requires
balancing, such as under the Fourth Amendment in deciding what is a
"reasonable" search or seizure.22 The levels of scrutiny, used through
out equal protection and individual rights analysis, are a form of bal
ancing, with the weights arranged on the scale in a particular fashion,
in favor of the law under rational basis review and against it under
strict scrutiny. Deciding whether a law serves a compelling or even a
legitimate interest requires a value choice.
This seems so obvious as to not even warrant explication. Yet, the
Supreme Court's opinions rarely acknowledge the indeterminacy of
the issues or the value choices involved. Quite the contrary, the opin
ions are written to make it seem that there is only one correct result
and that it was derived in a formalistic fashion that excludes individual
value choices.23 Consider how infrequently opinions even acknowledge
that issues are difficult and present close questions. To the extent the
indeterminacy is acknowledged or the value choices recognized, it is in
the dissenting opinions lamenting the majority's approach.
The legal realists buried formalism in the early decades of the
twentieth century,24 but in reading Supreme Court opinions, one gets
the sense that formalism is alive and thriving. This explains the con
tinuing vitality of originalism in Supreme Court opinions even though
critics have made a compelling case against it in the scholarly litera
ture.25 Originalism has the appeal of making it seem that the Court
isn't making value choices at all, but rather just following the intent of
the drafters.26 Of course, according such weight to the Framers is itself
21. Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514 (2001) (holding that the First Amendment pre
cludes the imposition of civil liability for using or disclosing the contents of illegally inter
cepted communications on a person who was not involved in the interception, but who knew
or had reason to know that the interception was unlawful).
22. See, e.g., United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266 (2002) (holding that reasonableness is
to be determined based on the totality of the circumstances).
23. My point here is descriptive - that the Court hides its value choices. Although I
believe that normatively this is undesirable and that greater candor would be preferaple, I
recognize that this is a separate argument and would require elaboration beyond the scope
or length of this Article. For excellent discussions of this topic, see Scott Altman, Beyond
Candor, 89 MICH. L. REV. 296 (1990); David L. Shapiro, In Defense of Judicial Candor, 100
HARV. L. REV. 731 (1987).
24. By formalism, I mean the approach to judicial decisionmaking that sees judges as
reasoning from determinate premises to determinate results. For an excellent summary of
the legal realists' critique of formalism, see MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION
OF AMERICAN LAW, 1870-1960, at 182-230 (1992).
25. See, e.g., Paul Brest, The Fundamental Rights Controversy: The Essential Contradic
tions of Normative Constitutional Scholarship, 90 YALE L.J. 1063 (1981); Jeffrey Shaman,
The Constitution, the Supreme Court and Creativity, 9 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 257 (1982);
Larry G. Simon, The Authority of the Framers of the Constitution: Can Originalist Interpreta
tion Be Justified?, 73 CAL. L. REV. 1482 (1985).
26. Justice Scalia offers a variant saying that interpretation should focus on "original
meaning" as evidenced by practices at the time rather than on the Framers' intent. See
ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW
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a value choice and besides, usually there are choices to make about
who counts as a Framer, what they thought, and at what level of ab
straction to state their views.
An important example of this is the Supreme Court's recent deci
sions expanding state sovereign immunity. In recent years, the Su
preme Court has substantially expanded the scope of state sovereign
immunity, such as by holding that Congress can authorize suits against
states only if it acts pursuant to section five of the Fourteenth
Amendment;27 that states cannot be sued under particular federal
laws, such as for patent infringement28 or for violating the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act29 or for employment discrimina
tion in violation of Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act;30 and
that state governments cannot be sued in state court without their con
sent.31 All of these rulings have been by 5-4 margins, with the majori
ties comprised of Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices O'Connor,
Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas. In every case, Justices Stevens, Souter,
Ginsburg, and Breyer have dissented.
Each of these cases ultimately is about a value choice concerning
the appropriate balance between state government immunity and state
government accountability. The text of the Constitution provides no
guidance because the Eleventh Amendment does not apply in state
court and even in federal court, it only bars suits against a state by citi
zens of other states and citizens of foreign countries. Nor is the
Framers' intent helpful because scholarship has shown that the goal of

(1997). Yet, discerning the "original meaning," deciding the level of abstraction at which to
state it, and applying it all involve value choices. See Erwin Chemerinsky, The Jurisprudence
of Justice Scalia: A Critical Appraisal, 22 U. HAW. L. REY. 385, 391-401 (2000).
27. Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996) (holding that Congress may override
the Eleventh Amendment when acting pursuant to section five of the Fourteenth Amend
ment but Congress may not override the Eleventh Amendment pursuant to any other consti
tutional authority).
28. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. 627
(1999) (holding that the Eleventh Amendment bars a claim against a state for violating pat
ents and that the Patent and Plant Protection Remedy Clarification Act is an unconstitu
tional exercise of Congress's authority under section five of the Fourteenth Amendment in
authorizing federal court jurisdiction for such claims against state governments).
29. Kimel v. Florida Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62 (2000) (holding that state governments
may not be sued in federal court for violating the Age Disc;rimination in Employment Act
and that the law is not a valid exercise of Congress's section five power that authorizes suits
against state governments).
30. Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356 (2001) (holding that state
governments may not be sued for employment discrimination in violation of section one of
the Americans with Disabilities Act).
31. Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706 (1999) (holding that because of state sovereign immu
nity, a state government may not be sued in state court without its consent and that Maine
could not be sued in Maine court for violating the Fair Labor Standards Act without its con
sent).
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the Eleventh Amendment was simply to preclude suits against states
based on diversity jurisdiction.32
Inescapably, the sovereign immunity cases are all about a choice
between protecting government immunity or ensuring government ac
countability. Yet, the decisions never acknowledge this. The opinions
are written without recognizing the underlying value choice being
made. The closest the Court ever has come is in Alden v. Maine.33
Justice Kennedy expressly spoke of the need for sovereign immunity
to protect state treasuries:
Not only must a State defend or default but also it must face the prospect
of being thrust, by federal fiat and against its will, into the disfavored
status of a debtor, subject to the power of private citizens to levy on its
treasury or perhaps even government buildings or property which the
State administers on the public's behalf.34

But this argument rests on an unsupported, and unacknowledged,
assumption: that protecting the government treasury is more impor
tant than the benefits of liability in terms of ensuring compensation
and deterrence. Sovereign immunity assumes that providing the gov
ernment immunity, so as to safeguard government treasuries, is more
important than ensuring government accountability. Yet, in none of
the sovereign immunity cases has the Supreme Court ever justified
this value choice.
Moreover, this is not a value that can be simply assumed to be
paramount under the Constitution. Basic constitutional principles such
as ensuring the supremacy of federal law, holding the government ac
countable, and providing due process all make sovereign immunity
unacceptable. Although abolishing sovereign immunity would impose
financial burdens on the government, the question is whether it is bet
ter to spread the costs of injuries from illegal government actions
among the entire citizenry than to make the wronged individual bear
the entire loss.35
My point is that the Court's sovereign immunity decisions are writ
ten in highly formalistic language to make it seem that the results are
dictated by the text and history when such is not the case at all. The
value choices by the Court are very much hidden and not discussed in
the majority opinions.

32. See William A. Fletcher, A Historical Interpretation of the Eleventh Amendment: A
Narrow Construction of an Affirmative Grant of Jurisdiction Rather Than a Prohibition
Against Jurisdiction, 35 STAN. L. REV. 1033 (1983); John J. Gibbons, The Eleventh Amend
ment and State Sovereign Immunity: A Reinterpretation, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 1889 (1983).
33. 527 U.S. 706 (1999).
34. Id. at 749.
35. I develop the argument against sovereign immunity in Erwin Chemerinsky, Against
Sovereign Immunity, 53 STAN. L. REV. 1201 (2001).
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This is not to say that the indeterminacy of constitutional law and
the value choices of the Justices are never acknowledged. Most com
monly, it is dissenting opinions that do so. For instance, in Garcia v.
San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority, then-Justice Rehnquist
declared that his dissenting view of the Tenth Amendment would
someday triumph and that there was no need to say more than that.36
Even more powerfully, Justice Blackmun, in a concurring opinion in
Planned Parenthood v. Casey, said that he was eighty-three years old
and would not remain on the Court much longer and the next presi
dent - to be chosen in November of that year - would make the
Supreme Court appointment that would decide the future of abortion
rights.37 In each of these instances, the Justices made it clear how much
decisions are a product of who is on the Court and their values. But
such acknowledgments are rare and even jarring when they occur.
B.

Opinions Are Written to Appear Consistent with Precedent, Even
When They Are Not

Precedent matters largely, and probably only, because there are
written opinions. Without them, there would not be any need for
courts to reconcile their decisions with earlier holdings. Perhaps
precedent would play some limited role without written opinions in
that courts would still try to decide like cases in a like manner. But
stare decisis as we know it would not be the same without pro
nouncements that count as the law to be followed in future cases.
An important aspect of the rhetoric of constitutional law is how
the Supreme Court deals with its precedents.38 The Court writes its
opinions to make them seem consistent with prior decisions, even
when they are not. For instance, in Griswold v. Connecticut, Justice
Douglas's majority opinion began by rejecting substantive due process
as a basis for finding a right to privacy in the Constitution.39 Instead,
Justice Douglas said that privacy was found in the penumbras of the
provisions of the Bill of Rights.40 In doing so, he cited to many cases
under specific provisions as supporting this view. Among those men-

36. 469 U.S. 528, 580 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
37. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 943 (1992) (Blackmun, J., concurring in
part, concurring in the judgment in part, and dissenting in part).
38. Judge Wald writes: "My hunch is that the bulk of the rhetoric of appellate opinions
is spent in explaining why past cases do or do not apply." Wald, supra note 1, at 1403.
39. 381 U.S. 479, 481-82 (1965).
40. One commentator described Justice Douglas's approach by writing: "[In Griswold,
Douglas] skipped through the Bill of Rights like a cheerleader - 'Give me a P . . . give me
an R . . . an I . . .' and so on, and found P-R-1-V-A-C-Y as a derivative or penumbra! right."
Robert G. Dixon, Jr., The "New" Substantive Due Process and the Democratic Ethic: A Pro
legmenon, 1976 BYU L. REV. 43, 84.
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tioned, Douglas listed Meyer v. Nebraska41 and Pierce v. Society of
Sisters42 as First Amendment cases.43 But neither was based on the
First Amendment; the First Amendment had not yet been incorpo
rated and applied to the states.44 Meyer and Pierce were unabashedly
substantive due process decisions finding a right of parents to control
the upbringing of their children within the liberty of the due process
clause. But Douglas, in an effort to reject substantive due process and
to make his approach seem consistent with precedent, mischaracter
izes the cases.45
Brandenburg v. Ohio, an important case concerning the First
Amendment, is another illustration of the Court making it seem that
its decision is consistent with precedent even when it is not.46 The issue
in Brandenburg was when speech is "incitement" that falls outside the
protection of the First Amendment. This, of course, is an issue the
Court struggled with throughout the twentieth century in some of the
most important free speech cases.47 In Brandenburg, the test for in
citement was presented as if the Court were simply reciting well es
tablished law announced in prior cases. The Court said that its prior
decisions:
have fashioned the principle that the constitutional guarantees of free
speech and free press do not permit a State to forbid or proscribe advo
cacy of the use of force or of law violation except where such advocacy is
directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is likely to
incite or produce such action.48

The Court cited to Dennis v. United States49 as establishing this test.

41. 262 U.S. 390 (1923) (holding that a state law prohibiting teaching of the German
language violates right of parents to control the upbringing of their children).
42. 268 U.S. 510 (1925) (holding a state law prohibiting parochial school education un
constitutional as violating the right of parents to control the upbringing of their children).
43. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 481-82.
44. The first case to incorporate the First Amendment was Git/ow v. New York, 268 U.S.
652 (1925), decided shortly after Pierce.
45. In fact, an even more profound way in which Griswold shows the importance of the
rhetoric of decisions is Douglas's vehement rejection of substantive due process, even
though his opinion ultimately relies on it. Douglas finds privacy in the penumbra of the Bill
of Rights. The Bill of Rights, however, is applied to the states through the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Therefore, what keeps states from infringing privacy
- as Douglas himself found it - is the Due Process Clause's prohibition against interfer
ence with liberty without a sufficient justification: substantive due process.
46. 395 U.S. 444 (1969) (per curiam).
47. See, e.g., Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357 (1927) (using a reasonableness test);
Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919) (articulating the "clear and present danger"
test).
48. Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 447.
49. Id. (citing Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 507 (1951)).
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But the Brandenburg test is nothing like the one used in Dennis. In
that case, the Court said that the protection of speech was to be de
termined by "ask[ing] whether the gravity of the evil, discounted by its
improbability, justifies such invasion of free speech as necessary to
avoid the danger."50 Brandenburg says nothing of the sort.
Brandenburg emphasizes the need for "imminent harm,'' while Dennis
expressly rejects such a requirement.51 Brandenburg contains an intent
requirement: the speech must be directed to causing the harm. Noth
ing like it is found in Dennis. Brandenburg's approach is very different
from any prior test for incitement announced by the Supreme Court.52
But the Court did not acknowledge this; to the contrary, the Court
made it seem that it was just following precedent.
The power of precedent also can be seen in the Court's hesitancy
to overrule earlier cases, even when there seems to be a majority
available to do so and even when there is a very good reason for doing
so. I always have been puzzled as to why the Supreme Court in up
holding Title II of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, which prohibits racial dis
crimination by places of public accommodation, relied on the
Commerce Clause rather than section five of the Fourteenth Amend
ment.53 The obvious answer is that the Civil Rights Cases, in 1883, held
that Congress under section five of the Fourteenth Amendment only
could regulate state and local governments and not private behavior.54
But there clearly seem to have been at least five votes on the Court
to overrule this aspect of the Civil Rights Cases. Just four years later,
in Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co.,55 the Court overruled the Civil Rights
Cases' holding that Congress could not regulate private behavior when
acting pursuant to Section Two of the Thirteenth Amendment. In fact,
just two years later, in United States v. Guest,56 six Justices expressly
stated that they believed that Congress could regulate private conduct
pursuant to section five of the Fourteenth Amendment.

50. Dennis, 341 U.S. at 510 (plurality opinion) (quoting United States v. Dennis, 183
F.2d 201, 212 (2d Cir. 1950)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
51. Dennis, 341 U.S. at 509 (plurality opinion).
52. See Gerald Gunther, Learned Hand and the Origins of Mo'dern First Amendment
Doctrine: Some Fragments of History, 27 STAN. L. REV. 719, 755 (1975) (describing the
Brandenburg test as "the most speech-protective standard yet evolved by the Supreme
Court").
53. Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964); Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United
States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964).
54. 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
55. 392 U.S. 409 (1968) (upholding the application of 42 U.S.C. § 1982 to private dis
crimination in housing).
56. 383 U.S. 745 (1966) (upholding a federal law protecting the right to travel from pri
vate interference). The six Justices, though, did not join in one opinion so as to make this a
holding of the Court.
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In upholding Title II of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, only two Justices
Douglas and Goldberg - said that they preferred to rely on
section five as authority.57 Why didn't the majority do so? The only
explanation seems to be that they did not want to write an opinion
that overruled precedent, especially in upholding an important and
controversial law. Yet, this rhetorical choice had long-term conse
quences as the Court in United States v. Morrison,58 in 2000, said that
the law was clear that the Civil Rights Cases never had been overruled
and that Congress could not regulate private behavior pursuant to sec
tion five. Perhaps the Court would have come to the same conclusion
in Morrison even if it meant overruling decisions from the mid-1960s,
but this result seems less likely precisely because of the rhetorical
power of precedent.
The rhetorical force of precedent also is seen in how the Court
writes its opinions when it does overrule earlier decisions. The Court
describes the earlier rulings as aberrations and its current interpreta
tion as the long-standing approach, even when that is not at all the
case. As described above, the Court writes the opinions to avoid ac
knowledging that there is a value choice being made, almost always
changing the law as a result of shifts in the composition of the Court.
In Seminole Tribe v. Florida,59 the Court overruled Pennsylvania v.
Union Gas Co.,60 which had been decided just seven years earlier.
Pennsylvania v. Union Gas held that Congress could override the
Eleventh Amendment and authorize suits against states pursuant to
any of its powers, so long as the law was clear in the text in permitting
such litigation. But in Seminole Tribe, the Court expressly overruled
this and held that Congress only could abrogate the Eleventh
Amendment when acting pursuant to section five of the Fourteenth
Amendment.
What happened during those seven years between Pennsylvania v.
Union Gas and Seminole Tribe v. Florida? Did the Court find a musty,
long-buried history of the Eleventh Amendment that showed that it
had made a mistake? Had Pennsylvania v. Union Gas proven impossi
ble to apply in practice? Of course not; the only difference was a
change in the composition of the Court. Pennsylvania v. Union Gas
had been a 5-4 decision with the majority comprised of Justices
Brennan, White, Marshall, Blackmun, and Stevens; the dissent was
57. Heart of Atlanta, 379 U. S. at 280 (Douglas, J., concurring) ("I would prefer to rest
the assertion of legislative power [on] § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment . . . ."); id. at 293
(Goldberg, J., concurring).
58. 529 U. S. 598 (2000) (invalidating the civil damages provision of the Violence Against
Women Act as exceeding the scope of Congress's powers under the Commerce Clause and
under section five of the Fourteenth Amendment).
59. 517 U. S. 44 (1996).
60. 491 U. S. 1 (1989).
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Rehnquist, O'Connor, Scalia, and Kennedy. In the intervening years,
four of the five in the majority - Brennan, White, Marshall, and
Blackmun - had retired from the Court, but all of the dissenters re
mained. The four dissenters were joined by Justice Thomas to create a
majority to overrule Pennsylvania v. Union Gas. Did the Court ex
plain it this way? Certainly not; Chief Justice Rehnquist's majority
opinion described Pennsylvania v. Union Gas as having "deviated
sharply from our established federalism jurisprudence."61
Similarly, in Payne v. Tennessee,62 the Court overruled two recent
decisions - one from two years earlier63 and the other from four years
prior64 - and held that victim-impact statements are admissible in sen
tencing at capital trials. Payne's overruling of recent precedent was en
tirely a product of changes in the membership of the Court. But Chief
Justice Rehnquist's majority opinion does not even acknowledge this
reality. Instead, the opinion in Payne focuses on why the earlier deci
sions were aberrational departures from prior rulings and should be
overruled.
All of this illustrates the key point concerning the powerful role of
precedent in constitutional opinions. Even when they are overruled,
the Court works hard to justify why its new approach is actually con
sistent with long-standing decisions. A significant portion of almost
every Supreme Court opinion is about how the decisions fit within,
and flow from, the earlier cases.
C.

Opinions Are Written to Make Decisions Seem Restrained, Rather
Than Activist; Dissents Criticize Decisions as Activist and Not
Restrained

Over the last few decades, political rhetoric frequently focuses on
whether decisions are "judicial activism." In presidential debates and
in the judicial confirmation process, avoiding judicial activism is seen
as an important virtue. Of course, the concepts of "judicial activism"
and "judicial restraint" are never defined with any precision. I often
have the sense that judicial activism is simply the label used for deci
sions one does not like.
The rhetoric of activism and restraint also appears in Supreme
Court decisions, particularly in dissenting opinions. Dissenters fre
quently characterize majority opinions as activist in nature. This is
seen as a serious criticism, even though the normative basis for the
conclusion is rarely explained. Obviously, judicial activism can be
61. Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 45:
62. 501 U.S. 808 (1991).
63. South Carolina v. Gathers, 490 U.S. 805 (1989).
64. Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S. 496 (1987).
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good or bad. Brown v. Board of Education was activist in the sense
that it overturned laws in many states and overruled precedent, but
few today would deny that it was a good decision.65 Plessy v. Ferguson
was an exercise in judicial restraint in that it upheld a law mandating
segregation, but it was tragic and impossible to reconcile with a com
mitment to equal protection.66 But judicial activism can be bad, such as
in the Lochner era,67 and judicial restraint good, such as in upholding
the 1964 Civil Rights Act.68 Although obviously each characterization
is a value judgment, most commentators and Justices likely would
agree with these views. However, rhetoric, both popular and in judicial
opinions, treats judicial activism as inherently bad and judicial re
straint as always good.
Both liberals and conservatives are fond of characterizing the deci
sions that they don't like as judicial activism. For example, the more
liberal Justices have attacked the Supreme Court's federalism deci
sions, such as in using the Tenth Amendment as a limit on Congress
and in expanding sovereign immunity, as undue judicial activism.69 On
the other hand, conservatives frequently object to decisions protecting
individual rights on the same basis.70
Simply put, the rhetoric of activism and restraint is quite important
in both political discourse and judicial opinions. For the last few dec
ades, it has been conservatives using this rhetoric to attack decisions
expanding rights and protections under equal protection. Now,
though, with the activism coming from the right - particularly in deci
sions narrowing the scope of Congress's powers,71 expanding sovereign
immunity,72 and increasing the protections of the takings clause73 - it

65. 347 U.S. 483 (1954) ("Brown!").
66. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
67. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905) (invalidating a state's maximum-hour law).
68. Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964); Heart of Atlanta Motel Inc. v. United
States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964).
69. See, e.g., Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 761 (1999) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (objecting
to the Court's holding that state governments cannot be sued in state court without their
consent); id. at 760 (Souter, J., dissenting) (same); Nat'! League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S.
833, 868 (1976) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (objecting to the majority's use of the Tenth
Amendment as undue judicial activism).
70. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 980 (1992) (Scalia, J., concur
ring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part); Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep't of Health
Services, 497 U.S. 261, 300 (1990) (Scalia, J., concurring).
71. See, e.g., United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000); United States v. Lopez, 514
U.S. 549 (1995).
72. See, e.g., Kimel v. Florida Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62 (2000); Alden v. Maine, 527
U.S. 706 (1999); Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Sav. Bank, 527
U.S. 627 (1999).
73. Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606 (2001 ) (allowing takings challenges to regu
lations that were in place at the time property was acquired).
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will be interesting to see how, if at all, this rhetoric changes. Will con
servatives largely abandon attacking judicial activism since the activ
ism of today and the foreseeable future is likely to be in a conservative
direction? Will liberals increasingly adopt this rhetoric in criticizing
conservative decisions striking down laws based on federalism and
property rights?
D.

The Language Used by the Court Has Changed over Time

My impression - and this is no more than a subjective sense - is
that the language of opinions today is less eloquent and more sarcastic
than before. I feel less confident about the former statement and much
more so about the latter.
I cannot think of recent opinions that had the eloquence of Justice
Louis Brandeis's explanation for the protection of freedom of speech
in Whitney v. California,74 or of Justice Robert Jackson's in West
Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette.75 But perhaps this is un
fair because these examples are exceptional opinions from the past
that surely were atypical even then. My sense of opinions today is that
they are much longer than they used to be, far more extensively foot
noted, and generally less well-written than those from earlier times.76
But it seems much more certain that there has been a great change
in that Justices are far more willing to use a "poison pen" and be very
sarcastic. Justice Scalia is the prime example of this phenomenon.77 In
dissenting opinions he describes the majority's approaches as "nothing
short of ludicrous" and "beyond the absurd,"78 "entirely irrational"79
and not "pass[ing] the most gullible scrutiny."80 He has declared that a
majority opinion is "nothing short of preposterous" and that it "has no
foundation in American constitutional law, and barely pretends to."81
He talks about how "one must grieve for the Constitution" because of
a majority's approach.82 He calls the approaches taken in majority

74. 274 U.S. 357, 375 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring).
75. 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
76. Some suggest that this might be attributed to the greater role of law clerks in draft
ing opinions. See BERNARD SCHWARTZ, DECISION: How THE SUPREME COURT DECIDES
CASES 257-62 (1996) (lamenting the increased role of clerks in the Supreme Court's work).
77. This discussion is drawn from my earlier article: Chemerinsky, supra note 26.
78. Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 637 (1992) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
79. Austin v. Michigan State Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 685 (1990) (Scalia,
J., dissenting).
80. Morgan v. Illinois, 504 U.S. 719, 748 (1992) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
81. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 653 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
82. Morrison v Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 726 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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op1mons "preposterous"83 and "ridiculous" and "so unsupported in
reason and so absurd in application [as] unlikely to survive.
He
speaks of how a majority opinion "vandaliz[es] . . . our people's tradi
tions."85
Perhaps most famously, in Webster v. Reproductive Health Services,
he pointedly attacked Justice O'Connor for not joining him in over
ruling Roe v. Wade and said that her position "cannot be taken seri
ously."86 He talks about how her opinion "preserves a chaos that is
evident to anyone who can read and count."87 He describes how "irra
tional is the new concept that Justice O'Connor introduces into the
law" and complains that her approach is "the least responsible."88
In other cases, he says that he must "respond to a few of the more
outrageous arguments in today's majority opinion, which it is beyond
human nature to leave unanswered."89 He describes majority opinions
as "nothing less than Orwellian" and talks about how he is "appalled"
by majority approaches.90
When appraising this rhetoric, my question is whether this is how
we want to teach law students to speak in their briefs and in courts.
One of the primary audiences for Supreme Court opinions is law stu
dents. The message that they take from reading Justice Scalia's opin
ions is that this is an acceptable way to characterize positions with
which they disagree and to talk about their adversaries. No doubt,
Justice Scalia's pointed rhetoric makes his opinions among the most
entertaining to read. He has a great flair for language and does not
mince words when he disagrees with a position. But I think that this
approach sends exactly the wrong message to law students and attor
neys about what type of discourse is appropriate in a formal legal set
ting and how it is acceptable to speak to one another.
"84

II. THE AUDIENCE
A crucial part of any rhetorical enterprise is the audience. Rhetoric
exists to persuade an audience. It is possible to identify many different
audiences for Supreme Court decisions: a) lower courts; b) govern83. Bd. of Educ. of Kiryas Joel Viii. Sch. Dist.
(Scalia, J., dissenting).

v.

Grumet, 512 U.S. 687, 735 (1994)

84. Grady v. Corbin, 495 U.S. 508, 542, 543 (1990) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
85. J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127, 163 (1994) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
86. 492 U.S. 490, 532 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
87. Id. at 535.
88. Id. at 536 n.*, 537.
89. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 981 (1992) (Scalia, J., concurring in the
judgment in part and dissenting in part).
90. Id. at 995, 998.
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meh.t officials who must follow and implement the rulings; c) lawyers
who will litigate future cases; d) the parties to that case; e) the public;
f) professional critics (such as journalists who cover the Court and es
pecially law professors); and g) future Justices on the Supreme
Court.91
I believe that each of these audiences is important and influences,
and normatively should influence, how opinions are written.92 In fact,
the needs of these audiences provide criteria for evaluating Supreme
Court opinions. Opinions are written precisely because there are im
portance audiences for them. Thus, opinions can be evaluated based
on how they meet the needs of these audiences.
Also, the desire to appeal to these audiences might point in con
flicting directions; what is best for one audience may be undesirable
for another. Recognizing this fact can provide insights in understand
ing particular opinions.
A. Lower Courts
One of the most important audiences for Supreme Court opinions
is the lower courts that must follow them and apply them to future
cases. This imposes a crucial duty on the Court to write its opinions so
as to provide guidance to lower courts. In other words, the Supreme
Court's rhetoric must serve a key functional goal: state the law in a
manner that can be used by lower courts.
The Court, however, often fails in this responsibility. An example
of such failure is the Court's decision in Brown II, in which it did not
give guidance to lower courts as to how to achieve school desegrega
tion.93 The Court remanded the cases to the lower courts to use tradi
tional equity principles to fashion remedies "to admit to public schools
on a racially nondiscriminatory basis with all deliberate speed the par
ties to these cases."94 This enigmatic statement - "deliberate
speed"- seems an oxymoron, imposed no mandate and provided no
91. I do not mean to imply that this is an exhaustive list of possible audiences. For ex
ample, there may be an international audience for Supreme Court decisions. See, e.g., MARY
L. DUDZIAK, COLD WAR CIVIL RIGHTS: RACE AND THE IMAGE OF AMERICAN
DEMOCRACY (2000) (arguing that the Cold War influenced the Court in the school desegre
gation decisions).
92. The extent to which Justices are consciously considering these audiences in writing
opinions is unknown. It seems likely that some of these audiences, such as lower courts, are
more consciously considered than others, such as professional critics. Certainly it is possible
that the issue of audience is not thought of at all in writing a particular opinion. The discus
sion below, however, does not depend on conscious recognition by the Justices in every case
of the identity of the audience. Rather, the point is that descriptively these are the audiences
for Supreme Court opinions and normatively there are implications for how opinions should
be written because of the importance of these audiences.
93. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 349 U.S. 294 (1955) ("Brown I I'').
94. Id. at 301.
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assistance to lower courts in carrying out the promise of Brown v.
Board of Education.
The very slow pace of desegregation of schools, in part, is a result
of the Supreme Court's failure to specify the responsibilities of lower
courts.95 In 1964, a decade after Brown, in the South, just 1.2% of
black school children were attending school with whites.96 In South
Carolina, Alabama, and Mississippi, not one black child attended a
public school with a white child in the 1962-1963 school year.97 In
North Carolina, only 1/ 5 of 1%
or 0.026%
of the black students
attended desegregated schools in 1961, and the figure did not rise
above 1% until 1965.98 Similarly, in Virginia, in 1964, only 1.63% of
blacks were attending desegregated schools.99 Perhaps massive resis
tance was inevitable and nothing could have changed these events; but
maybe Supreme Court opinions detailing the duties of lower courts
could have hastened desegregation.
Another example of the Supreme Court's failure to give guidance
to lower courts is its recent decision in Brentwood Academy v.
Tennessee Secondary School Athletic Ass'n. 1 00 In Brentwood, the Court
found that a private entity regulating high school athletics was a state
actor based on the government's "entwinement" with its activities. In
finding "entwinement," Justice Souter emphasized that eighty-four
percent of the members of the private entity were public schools, that
the state traditionally had delegated regulating interscholastic athletics
to the entity, that most of its funds came from public schools, and that
most of its meetings were held on government property. The Court
said that together these factors justified applying the Constitution to
the private entity's activities.
The key question concerning the Brentwood Academy case is
whether it creates a new, broader exception to the state action doc
trine and, if so, when it applies. Notably, Justice Souter does not use
the traditional term in state action cases, "entanglement," in his ma
jority opinion, but uses instead the word "entwinement." Justice
Clarence Thomas, in a dissenting opinion, objected that "[w]e have
never found state action based upon mere 'entwinement.' " 1 01 "Entan-

-

95. For a lengthy discussion of the failure to achieve desegregation and possible expla
nations, see GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE 39-166 (1991).
96. Michael J. Klarman, Brown, Racial Change, and the Civil Rights Movement, 80 VA.

L. REV. 7, 9 (1994).

97. Id. at 9.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. 531

U.S. 288 (2001).

101. Id. at 935 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
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glement," in prior cases like Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 1 02 had been found
to require government encouragement of constitutional violations by
private actors. But no encouragement was found in Brentwood
Academy. Instead, the Court found that significant government in
volvement with the private entity was sufficient for a finding of state
action.
This seems to be a much more expansive exception to the state ac
tion doctrine than that found in prior cases. But the exception is not
defined. Although the Court identifies the factors that cause it to find
the Tennessee Secondary Schools Athletic Association to be a state
actor, it offers no criteria for determining more generally when there
is enough entwinement for state action. It almost always is possible to
find some degree of government involvement in private conduct. How
much is enough to meet the test for "entwinement"? The Court
doesn't even offer clues to lower courts that will have to apply its
opinion.
Some, such as Professor Cass Sunstein, praise very narrow rulings
as desirable "constitutional minimalism."103 But the problem is that
such minimalist opinions fail the needs of a key audience for the deci
sions: the lower courts that must follow them.
B.

Government Officials

Because of the state action doctrine, constitutional decisions virtu
ally always involve the government as one of the parties. Government
officials at all levels must understand the Supreme Court's decisions
and follow them in future actions. This imposes an important duty on
the Court to write opinions in a way that guides these officials as to
what is permissible and what is not allowed. Sometimes, such as in
criminal procedure cases, the audience is the police who need guid
ance as to what is permissible investigative behavior. Sometimes, the
audience is the legislature that needs to be guided as to what future
laws in the area are permissible and will not be struck down.
This realization helps to explain and justify Supreme Court opin
ions that are very prescriptive in terms of what the government can, or
even must, do. For instance, in Roe v. Wade, 1 04 the Court divided
pregnancy into three trimesters and specified the types of regulations
that are permissible during each.105 Some criticize the Court for this
102. 457 U.S. 830 (1982) (finding no state action when a private school that was almost
totally subsidized by the government fired teachers because of their speech).
103. CASS R. SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME: JUDICIAL MINIMALISM IN THE
SUPREME COURT (1999); Cass R. Sunstein, The Supreme Court, 1995 Term - Foreword:
Leaving Things Undecided, 1 10 HARV. L. REV. 4 (1996).
104. 410 U.S. 1 13, 163-64 (1973).
105. Id.
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decision, which seems almost legislative in its dictates.106 But this criti
cism ignores the value of the clear guidance given to legislatures by
the Court's opinion in Roe v. Wade. By describing in detail what was
allowed and what was not permitted, the Court served the needs of
legislatures seeking to regulate abortion after Roe.
Similarly, in Miranda v. Arizona, 1 01 the Court prescribed warnings
that police must administer before questioning a suspect in custody.
Miranda has been criticized as seeming unduly legislative. But this
criticism ignores the benefit of the opinion in giving clear guidance to
police officers as to what they need to do in order for confessions to be
admissible. After Miranda, every officer knew exactly what to say in
order for a confession to be presumed voluntary and likely admissible
as evidence in court.
Other opinions might be criticized precisely for their failure to of
fer sufficient guidance to government officials as to how to act in the
future. Among other criticisms, Bush v. Gore can be faulted on this
basis.108 In Bush, the Court made it clear that it was just deciding the
case before it and declared: "Our consideration is limited to the pres
ent circumstances, for the problem of equal protection in election pro
cesses generally presents many complexities."109 It was predictable,
however, that there would be lawsuits all over the country challenging
variations within states in conducting elections and counting votes.
Bush gives state and local election officials no guidance as to which
variations are permissible and which are unconstitutional.
C.

Lawyers

Another crucial audience for Supreme Court opinions are attor
neys who must base arguments and advice to clients on them. This
audience, like lower courts and government officials, needs guidance
as to what constitutes an acceptable and persuasive argument. This
imposes a burden on the Court to articulate its standards in a consis
tent manner and to follow consistent approaches to interpreting par
ticular constitutional provisions.
Yet here too, the Court often fails in its opinion writing. Consider
the Court's recent opinions interpreting the Fourth Amendment.
There is no consistent approach and thus little guidance to lawyers
concerning how to argue a Fourth Amendment case or to lower courts
regarding how to analyze one. Often the Court's approach focuses en106. See, e.g., John Hart Ely, The Wages of Crying Wolf" A Comment on Roe v. Wade,
82 YALE L.J. 920 (1973).
107. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
108. 531 U.S. 98 (2000) (per curiam).
109. Id. at 109.
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tirely on "reasonableness" and balances the government's interests in
effective law enforcement against the individual's expectations of pri
vacy. For instance, in the recent decision Arvizu v. United States, the
Court held that it was permissible to stop a vehicle, based solely on le
gal and innocuous behavior because it was "reasonable" based on the
totality of the circumstancesY0
But sometimes the Court disavows a reasonableness inquiry and
focuses entirely on historical practices. In Atwater v. City of Lago
Vista, 111 the Court held that it is permissible for the police to arrest an
individual for a misdemeanor that carries no possibility of a prison
sentence. Justice Souter's majority opinion focused solely on history
and upheld such arrests because they were allowed when the Fourth
Amendment was ratified in 1791. Justice O'Connor's dissent stressed
the need for a reasonableness inquiry, but the majority rejected this
argument and focused solely on history.
In other Fourth Amendment cases, the Court creates a bright-line
rule that eschews a reasonableness balancing approach. In Kyllo v.
United States, for example, the Court held that thermal imaging of a
home is a search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.112
Justice Scalia's majority opinion does not focus on reasonableness or
historical practices (since thermal imaging obviously did not exist in
1791), but instead on the need for special protection of the home in
light of the language and history of the Fourth Amendment.
How is a lawyer supposed to litigate Fourth Amendment issues,
something that comes up every day in criminal courts across the coun
try? To return to a prior point, how is a lower court to write the opin
ion? Should the focus be on balancing, history, or a bright-line rule?
The Court's varying and inconsistent approaches fail to give the essen
tial guidance to those who must rely on its opinions.
D.

The Parties

One reason for having written opinions is to provide the parties
with an explanation for why they have won, or more importantly, lost.
Written opinions make decisions seem not an arbitrary exercise of
power, but a result of careful reasoning. Yet, in reading opinions,
there is little explicit recognition that the parties are an audience for
the opinions. Supreme Court opinions, like those of every court, are
densely written, often using jargon and technical language. This may
be necessary to meet the needs of other audiences, but it also means
1 10. 534 U.S. 266 (2002). Among the factors the Court pointed to were the car being
near a border where smuggling often occurs, the driver not waving at the police officer, the
children looking uncomfortable, and the car being a minivan.
1 1 1 . 532 U.S. 318 (2001).
1 12. 533 U.S. 27 (2001).
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that the opinions will be difficult for many of the parties to under
stand.
More importantly, the way in which the Supreme Court refers to
the parties, sometimes using deprecating language, shows, at the very
least, inattention to this audience. An extreme example of this inatten
tion is Justice Holmes's infamous language in Buck v. Bell, in which he
upheld the ability of the government to impose involuntary steriliza
tion on the mentally retarded and declared, "Three generations of im
beciles are enough."113 Is it possible to imagine a Justice writing such a
thing if he thought that there was a chance that the person he was
writing about might read the opinion? In 1 980, Carrie Buck was found
to be alive and to be a woman of normal intelligence who very well
might have read Holmes's words.114
The Court's indifference to the parties is also reflected in other
ways in its rulings. For example, in Tyler v. Cain, the Court ruled that
a prisoner cannot bring a successive habeas corpus petition, even if
there is a Supreme Court case on point making it clear that the indi
vidual was unconstitutionally convicted, unless the Court expressly
states that the new decision applies retroactively.115 In Tyler, the Court
said that there was no relief available to an individual even though the
jury instructions were unquestionably unconstitutional under a prior
Supreme Court decision. These cases illustrate that the Court is willing
to accept individuals, parties to the cases before it, being held uncon
stitutionally and indefinitely.
All of this creates the sense that the parties are almost incidental in
Supreme Court opinions. The Court sees its decisions as less about re
solving particular disputes and more about setting law for the future.
Yet, it can be questioned whether these are as mutually exclusive as
the Court's opinions make them seem.
E.

The Public

The public seems an unlikely audience for Supreme Court opin
ions. After all, relatively few members of the public actually read the
opinions, though many learn about them through media stories. Yet,
this is an audience that has played an important part in constitutional
theory. Some, such as Justice Felix Frankfurter and Professors
Alexander Bickel and Jesse Choper, have based their approaches to
constitutional interpretation on the need to preserve and enhance the
Court's legitimacy with the general public.116 Daniel Conkle, for ex1 13. 274 U.S. 200, 207 (1927).
1 14. Stephen Jay Gould, Carrie Buck 's Daughter, 2 CONST. COMM. 331, 336 (1985).
115. 533 U.S. 656 (2001).
1 16. See, e.g., Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 267 (1962) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (criti
cizing the Court's reapportionment decisions on the grounds that they will jeopardize the
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ample, speaks of the "fragile legitimacy that attaches to Supreme
Court pronouncements of constitutional law."117
Yet, such concerns about this audience seem quite unfounded. At
a time when other government institutions are often held in disrepute,
the Court's credibility is high. Professors John M. Scheb and Williams
Lyons set out to measure and determine this. 1 1 8 They conducted a sur
vey to answer the question: "How do the American people regard the
U.S. Supreme Court?" Their conclusion is important:
According to the survey data, Americans render a relatively positive as
sessment of the U.S. Supreme Court. Not surprisingly, the Court fares
considerably better in public opinion than does Congress. The respon
dents are almost twice as likely to rate the Court's performance as
"good" or "excellent" as they are to give these ratings to Congress. By
the same token, they are more than twice as likely to rate Congress' per
formance as "poor."119

Strikingly, Scheb and Lyons found that the "Court is fairly well
regarded across the lines that usually divide Americans."12° For exam
ple, there are no significant differences between how Democrats and
Republicans rate the Court's performance.
In fact, Bush v. Gore1 21 lends support for the view that judicial
credibility is not fragile and that preserving legitimacy need not be a
primary focus in decisionmaking and opinion writing. After Bush,
many suggested that it would undermine the Court's credibility with
the general public. Justice Stevens expressed this concern when he
wrote:
[that the] position by the majority of the Court can only lend credence to
the most cynical appraisal of the work of judges throughout the land . . . .
Although we may never know with complete certainty the identity of the
winner of this year's Presidential election, the identity of the loser is par
ticularly clear. It is the Nation's confidence in the judge as an impartial
guardian of the rule of law.122

Yet, this loss of confidence is not manifest in any apparent way.
Opinion polls show no substantial loss of approval in the Court among

Court's legitimacy); ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 12 (2d ed.
1986); JESSE H. CHOPER, JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE NATIONAL POLITICAL PROCESS
(1980).
1 17. Daniel 0. Conkle, The Legitimacy of Judicial Review in Individual R ights Cases:
Michael Perry 's Constitutional Theory and Beyond, 69 MINN. L. REV. 587, 588 (1985).
1 18. John M. Scheb I I & William Lyons, Public Holds U.S. Supreme Cou rt in High Re gard, 77 JUDICATURE 273 (1994).
1 1 9. Id.
120. Id. at 273-74.
121. 531 U.S. 98 (2000).
122. Id. at 128-29 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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the public.123 Why not? Perhaps it is that any loss of confidence among
Democrats is offset by an increase in confidence among Republicans.
Perhaps it is that people, more than commentators acknowledge, re
alize that the Court inherently makes "political" decisions and thus
were not "shocked" by Bush v. Gore. Perhaps it is that the public
thought that the election was so close that any victor would be arbi
trary and thus was willing to accept any result. Perhaps it is that any
effects were short-lived and public concern shifted elsewhere. What
ever the reason, Bush v. Gore certainly casts doubt on those who
worry about the Court having fragile legitimacy with the public.
This realization should matter greatly in decisionmaking and
opinion writing. The Court need not worry in deciding cases as to their
impact on public attitudes about the Court. Nor need it write opinions
to hide its reasoning so as to make the decisions seem formalistic. The
public is an audience, at least indirectly, for Supreme Court opinions,
but it is not an audience whose support is fickle or likely to be lost be
cause of a single decision or even series of rulings.
But that does not mean that the public is an unimportant audience
for Court decisions. Significant rulings on controversial issues will af
fect the public. It is particularly important in such cases for opinions to
be written in a clear and accessible manner so that the public, largely
through media reports, can understand the Court's reasoning and the
basis for its conclusions. Also, and this is admittedly speculation, the
Internet will increase the number of people who actually read
Supreme Court opinions as people can do so on their own computers
without a need to find a law library.
F.

Professional Critics

The most consistent readers of Supreme Court opinions are the
journalists who are permanently at the Court and report on the rulings
for the general public and, of course, law professors. These are the in
dividuals who avidly read the opinions, argue over their meaning, and
critique their writing and reasoning.
It is hard to identify specific ways in which this audience affects the
rhetoric of constitutional law and yet it seems inevitable that Justices
care about what this audience has to say. Three of the nine Justices Scalia, Ginsburg, and Breyer - spent most of their careers before
going on the bench as law professors. Nor does it seem likely that any
one can be completely immune to words of praise or criticism that are
publicly expressed.
But the impact of the existence of this audience is difficult to de
scribe; it generally seems an incentive for carefully reasoned and writ123. See Jeffrey Jones, Hispanics, Whites, Rate Bush Positively, While Blacks are Much
More Negative, GALLUP POLL MONTHLY, June 2001, at 36.
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ten opinions and, perhaps in specific cases, is a conscious influence.
One thought is that Justices likely respond to the reactions from par
ticular audiences, rather than general reactions from journalists or
academics. For instance, it seems highly unlikely that liberal criticism
of his rulings has the slightest effect on Justice Scalia, but praise from
conservatives might matter a great deal. In other words, the impact of
the speaker depends on his or her identity, hardly a surprising or novel
conclusion.
G. Future Decisions
A final important audience for the Court's opinions is the Justices
who will decide future cases in the area. This seems most obvious in
concurring and dissenting opinions, which often seem to be written to
influence future cases. For example, Justice Harlan's dissenting opin
ion concerning the scope of Congress's powers under section five of
the Fourteenth Amendment in Katzenbach v. Morgan124 became the
majority approach in City of Boerne v. Flores.125 The dissents con
cerning the admissibility of victim-impact statements in Booth v.
Maryland126 and South Carolina v. Gathers127 became the majority a
short time later in Payne v. Tennessee.128
More subtly, and harder to prove, is when majority opinions in
clude language that seems placed there to be used in future decisions.
For example, in Rizzo v. Goode, then-Justice Rehnquist's majority
opinion dismissed a suit against the Philadelphia police on standing
grounds but then went on to say that principles of federalism limited
judicial review of actions by local police departments.129 This state
ment seems to have been placed there to provide a basis for dismissing
future cases, even where there was standing. If followed, it would have
a profound effect in limiting review of police conduct, and perhaps
other local tasks, by the federal courts.
Justices surely hope that their opinions will be followed. Majority
opinions are written to stand the test of time and to control future de
cisions. Concurring and dissenting opinions often seem written to ap
peal to a future Court.

124. 384 U.S. 641, 666 (1966) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
125. 521 U.S. 507 (1997) (declaring the Religious Freedom Restoration Act unconstitu
tional and holding that Congress under section five of the Fourteenth Amendment cannot
expand the scope of rights or create new rights).
126. 482 U.S. 496 (1987).
127. 490 U.S. 805 (1989).
128. 501 U.S. 808 (1991).
129. 423 U.S. 362, 380 (1976).
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Conclusion

My central point is that it is important to identify the audiences for
Supreme Court opinions and that doing so generates important in
sights about what the Court does and should do. The above discussion
is preliminary; it is exhaustive about neither the audiences that exist
nor their significance in opinion writing.
III.

THE SPEAKER

Of course, any rhetorical enterprise involves a speaker. A few im
portant characteristics of the speaker in judicial opinions can be iden
tified.
First, there is a tradition of signed opinions. Majority opinions al
ways are written to speak for "the Court" as a whole; yet, except for
per curium opinions, they are signed by individuals. Early in American
history, each Justice wrote an opinion in each case, so-called "seria
tim" opinions. Chief Justice John Marshall changed this practice, so
that since the early nineteenth century the tradition has been a major
ity opinion identified as having been written by a single Justice and
joined by at least half of the other Justices on the Court.130 The tradi
tion certainly could have developed differently, with all majority
opinions being per curium and the identity of the authors remaining
undisclosed. Such an approach would have increased the sense that all
opinions are truly from the Court as a whole.
Yet, the practice of the last two centuries of signed majority opin
ions emphasizes the role and voice of the individual Justice at the
same time as the edicts of the Court's majority is being expressed. Ob
viously, Justices take very seriously their role as author and speaker
for the Court. Recently, I noticed that in Brady v. Maryland the opin
ion says, "Opinion of the Court by Mr. Justice Douglas, announced by
Mr. Justice Brennan."131 Individual attribution is so valued that it is
even identified when another Justice reads the opinion from the
bench.
The importance of authorship also is reflected in instances in which
the Court deviates from its usual practices. For instance, in Cooper v.
Aaron, each Justice individually signed the majority opinion to con
vey, clearly and unequivocally, the Court's insistence that state courts
and governments comply with federal desegregation orders.132 A fed
eral district court had ordered the desegregation of the Little Rock,
130. See G. EDWARD WHITE, THE MARSHALL COURT AND CULTURAL CHANGE, 18151835, at 186 (abr. ed. 1 991).
131. 373 U.S. 83, 84 (1963) (holding that prosecutors must disclose to defendants poten
tially exculpatory evidence).
132. 358 U.S. 1 (1958).
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Arkansas, public schools. The State disobeyed this order, in part,
based on professed concern that compliance would lead to violence,
and, in part, based on a claim that it was not bound to comply with ju
dicial desegregation decrees.
In an unusual opinion, signed individually by each Justice, the
Court rejected this position and emphatically declared:
[Marbury] declared the basic principle that the federal judiciary is su
preme in the exposition of the law of the Constitution, and that principle
has ever since been respected by this Court and the Country as a perma
nent and indispensable feature of our constitutional system. It follows
that the interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment enunciated by this
Court in the

Brown case is the supreme law of the land . . . .

No state legislator or executive or judicial officer can war against the
Constitution without violating his undertaking to support it.133

The Court strongly reaffirmed Brown and said that it could not be
nullified either "openly and directly by state legislators or state execu
tive or judicial officers" or "indirectly by them through evasive
schemes for segregation whether attempted 'ingeniously or ingenu
ously.' "134
The choice to have every Justice individually sign this opinion ob
viously was done for rhetorical purposes. The Justices wanted to
communicate a message to Little Rock and to the country about their
views with regard to desegregation orders and the duty of state and lo
cal governments to obey them.
Another example was the joint opinion by Justices O'Connor,
Kennedy, and Souter in Planned Parenthood v. Casey. 1 35 Rather than
the usual practice of one Justice authoring an opinion, joined by the
other two, each of these three Justices signed as author of the opinion.
Again, this choice seems clearly to have been motivated by rhetorical
considerations: the Justices saw themselves as announcing an impor
tant resolution of a controversial and crucial issue. Indeed, the first
sentence of their opinion indicates their sense of authoring a very sig
nificant opinion: "Liberty finds no refuge in a jurisprudence of
doubt."136
A second rhetorical aspect of the Supreme Court as speaker is its
desire for unanimity in handing down decisions where there is a seri
ous risk of disobedience by government officials. Brown v. Board of
Education is an obvious example of this.137 Many have written how
133. Id. at 18.
134. Id. at 17 (quoting Smith v . Texas, 311 U.S. 128, 132 (1940)).
135. 505 U.S. 833 (1992). For a fascinating account of how this opinion came to be writ
ten, see EDWARD LAZARUS, CLOSED CHAMBERS 459-86 (1999).
136. Id. at 844.
137. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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newly appointed Chief Justice Earl Warren perceived a need for una
nimity to convey a clear message to the country, and particularly to
southern states, about the Court's resolve and commitment.138 In fact,
every desegregation case for twenty years was unanimous undoubt
edly for this reason.139
Similarly, unanimity undoubtedly was perceived as important in
United States v. Nixon, 1 40 where the Court ordered President Nixon to
produce the Watergate tapes that quickly led to his resignation.141
There was a real chance that President Nixon would disobey the
Court's order, especially if the Court was closely divided or there was
any ambiguity in its opinion.142
In cases like these, unanimity serves a key rhetorical function. A
unanimous decision conveys a message of the Court's agreement and
its resolve. It undermines the ability of an official considering dis
obeying the Court to argue that the decision was partisan or uncertain.
One more aspect of the Court as speaker that merits mention: the
need to produce an opinion that gains support of a majority undoubt
edly has a powerful effect on how many opinions are written. This of
ten exercises a powerful effect on how Justices' opinions are written.
Especially when the Court is closely divided, Justices write opinions in
a way to keep their majority. For instance, in Metro Broadcasting, Inc.
v. FCC,1 43 Justice Brennan's majority opinion upholding preferences
for minority-owned businesses in broadcast licensing invoked Justice
White's earlier opinion in Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC which
had upheld the Fairness Doctrine.144 Although the issues in the case
were quite different, Brennan seemed to be writing the opinion to ap
peal to White and his commitment to ensuring a diversity of views
over the broadcast media.
Brown v. Board of Education and the desegregation cases that
followed it again provide an important illustration. Neither in Brown
nor in any of the subsequent desegregation decisions did the Court
condemn laws requiring segregation as inherently violative of equal
138. See RICHARD KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE 679-99 (1975); G. EDWARD WHITE,
EARL WARREN 165-69 (1982).
139. The unanimity in desegregation cases ended in Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717
(1974) (holding 5-4, that inter-district desegregation remedies are permissible only if there is
proof of an inter-district violation).
140. 418 U.S. 683 (1974).
141. For an account of how Nixon was written within the Court, see BOB WOODWARD
& SCOTT ARMSTRONG, THE BRETHREN 301-47 (1979).
142. Nixon apparently raised the possibility of disobedience with his top advisers and
they pointed to the unanimity of the decision and its clear order in persuading him to com
ply. See BOB WOODWARD & CARL BERNSTEIN, THE FINAL DAYS 264 (1976).
143. 497 U.S. 547 (1990).
144. 395 U.S. 367 (1969).
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protection. Brown, of course, focused on the consequences of segrega
tion in education. The subsequent cases striking down Jim Crow laws
were handed down without any opinions.145 It is unclear why, but the
answer surely is about the rhetorical message. Perhaps it is because
the Court could not agree on an opinion so it simply announced a re
sult.146 Also, the Court's approach conveyed a sense that the conclu
sions were clear and obvious, so much so that no opinions were
needed.
CONCLUSION
My central thesis is that Supreme Court opinions are a rhetorical
enterprise and that this fact profoundly influences much of what the
Court does and also how the Court's decisions should be evaluated.
To paraphrase an old song, it's only words, but words are often all we
have.

145. See, e.g., Gayle v. Browder, 352 U.S. 903, affg mem. 142 F.Supp. 707 (D. Ala. 1956)
(municipal bus system); Holmes v. City of Atlanta, 350 U.S. 879, vacating mem. 223 F.2d 93
(5th Cir. 1955) (municipal golf course); Mayor and City Council of Baltimore City v.
Dawson, 350 U.S. 877, affg mem. 220 F.2d 386 ( 4th Cir. 1955) (public beaches).
146. The cases did not obviously flow from Brown precisely because Brown focused on
education and thus could not be used by itself to explain why segregation of beaches, buses,
or golf courses is unconstitutional.

